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Abstract
In recent years, scholars and practitioners alike have sought to better understand 
the emergent communicative processes involved in the implementation of 
strategic organizational initiatives. In response, this article builds on sensemaking 
and sensegiving theory to understand the interactions that developed between 
internal and external stakeholders in response to a post-9/11 change in the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act. A detailed, emergent account of a failed 
initiative was derived from public comments in the Federal Register, transcripts 
from public meetings, newspaper articles, and semistructured interviews with 
key internal informants. In-depth analysis of these data allowed us to examine a 
divergent sensemaking process and identify four critical triggers that led to a 
communication breakdown: (a) unidirectional and parsimonious communication, 
(b) multifaceted understandings of organizational identities, (c) misaligned cues, 
and (d) an emergence of interorganizational sensemaking. A first-order analysis 
presents data from an in-depth case analysis, and a second-order analysis uses the 
analysis to develop a divergent sensemaking conceptual model. From a strategic 
communication perspective, our findings demonstrate the importance of taking a 
broad perspective of the legitimate participants in a sensemaking process, as well as 
reconciling sensemaking trajectories to avoid contradictions between perspectives. 
We offer implications for theory, future research, and practice.
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Sensemaking and sensegiving help explain the convergent and divergent actions of 
organizational stakeholders in response to organizational change and strategy imple-
mentation (Hope, 2010; Lewis, 2000; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). To disentangle the 
dynamics of sensemaking and sensegiving, this article examines an incident that 
occurred at the Midwest District (MWD) headquarters of the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG). Over a 6-month period in 2006, the MWD sought to implement new 
training procedures to bring the regional units into compliance with national regula-
tions set forth in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and engaged 
in a complicated process of sensemaking and sensegiving. Sensemaking occurs when 
organizational members seek to understand and interpret past enactments and to set 
forth interpretations that guide the organization forward (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005). The sensemaking process embodies multiple stakeholders, both internal and 
external, and enables organizations to embark on trajectories of action (Brown & 
Jones, 2000; Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Gephart, 1993). On the other hand, organizations 
engage in sensegiving to influence others’ sensemaking and meaning construction 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). This reciprocal process occurs through communicative 
behavior, but further research is needed to disentangle the dynamics by which stake-
holders interact, and the mechanisms by which multiple interpretations (sensemaking 
trajectories) are reconciled (Kezar, 2013; Maitlis, 2005; Scott, Allen, Bonilla, Baran, 
& Murphy, 2013).
The new procedures implemented by the MWD focused on increasing prepared-
ness by raising the effectiveness of training. To raise effectiveness, the USCG man-
dated mounting of new weapons on patrol boats and running exercise drills using live 
ammunition (live fire) on the Great Lakes. Following routine procedure, the district 
headquarters published a public notice outlining proposed live fire safety zones for 
training with live ammunition on the Great Lakes in the Federal Register, a federal 
publication of agency notices, rules, and announcements. Unexpectedly, the MWD’s 
public notice announcing permanent training zones sparked unprecedented public out-
cry that developed into a major disruption. Six months later, the regional headquarters 
withdrew the proposal. In the end, the event had a significant negative impact on rela-
tionships between the public and the MWD, and the MWD has since reevaluated train-
ing procedures and its outreach to external stakeholders.
Analyzing the disruption of the MWD operations, this study builds on the Gioia 
and Chittipeddi (1991) model by detailing the ways that sensemaking and sensegiving 
processes by multiple stakeholders can unfold. The analysis demonstrates the impor-
tance of reconciling sensemaking trajectories to avoid contradictions between per-
spectives. This work further examines the context in which divergent sensemaking can 
occur and identifies a number of triggers that enable divergence. Previous research is 
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considered in the following sections and subsequently a first-order analysis (Van 
Maanen, 1979) of the MWD disruption is presented. Building on the initial review, a 
second-order analysis is developed to better understand divergent sensemaking as a 
conceptual model of breakdowns in stakeholder communication.
Influencing Organizational Events Through Sensemaking 
and Sensegiving
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) suggest viewing planned change and crises processes 
through the lens of sensemaking and sensegiving. Sensemaking is the individual con-
struction and reconstruction of meaning based on available information and experi-
ences; it is the process by which stakeholders seek to understand what has happened, 
and to develop a sense of what should be done moving forward. The process of sense-
making is often precipitated by a novel, confusing or ambiguous event (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014), or equivocality (Weick, 1995). Weick (1995) identifies seven key 
properties of sensemaking that outline the process by which individuals construct indi-
vidual identity, notice an event, frame the event based on their experiences, and come 
to create meaning based on both their individual framing and their interactions with 
others. In this framing, actors create their environments through dialogs and narratives 
(enactments) (Currie & Brown, 2003), and actors extract cues that help them deter-
mine what is relevant and what explanations are acceptable (Brown, Stacey, & 
Nandhakumar, 2008). Thus, sensemaking is a process that embodies both individual 
framing and interaction with others through social networks.
Simultaneously, sensegiving occurs when stakeholders attempt “to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred definition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442), in order to communicate 
a changed vision to stakeholders and constituents. A new interpretive scheme of 
existing events is communicated through symbols and symbolic action. In particu-
lar, when communication becomes routinized, there is an opportunity for key mem-
bers of an organization to engage in sensegiving, setting a path for future action by 
providing a clear path forward (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). Prior studies of sense-
giving focus on managerial action intended to influence subordinates toward a par-
ticular end goal (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Hope, 2010; Rouleu, 2005; Smith, 
Plowman, & Duchon, 2010), although sensegiving could also imply a broader politi-
cal agenda that could be employed to understand higher level action in organizations 
(Hope, 2010).
Sensemaking and Sensegiving as Interacting Trajectories
Sensegiving is often discussed within the context of the leadership of an organization 
(Bartunek, Krim, Necochia, & Humphries, 1999; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991). Here we go beyond leadership to understand how all stakeholders 
actively engage in sensegiving. In engaging with sensegiving, we seek to articulate the 
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iterative, sequential, and reciprocal processes of negotiation, both internally and exter-
nal to an organization. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) proposed a four-stage model that 
accounts for the process of sensemaking and sensegiving: (a) envisioning, (b) signal-
ing, (c) reenvisioning, and (d) energizing. In the first stage, the primary stakeholder 
engages in sensemaking and sets forth a vision for change or response. In the second 
stage, the primary stakeholder communicates a plan to stakeholders as sensegiving. In 
reenvisioning, internal and external stakeholders respond to the proposed plan, inter-
pret, and engage in sensemaking. In the last stage, stakeholders come into alignment 
on a revised plan for resolution.
The process of change—in response to a disruption, or in response to more mun-
dane managerial action—is a negotiation, through which stakeholders negotiate and 
interpret tasks (Isabella, 1990) through mutual sensemaking and sensegiving. 
Stakeholders negotiate meaning with the aim of moving toward agreement (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991). Convergent sensemaking is alluded to in existing sensemaking 
literature, whether describing successful organizational learning (Christianson, Farkas, 
Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009), a change initiative (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), a collapse 
of sensemaking (Weick, 1993), or a successful, yet inaccurate notion of sense in a 
crisis (Weick, 1988). Sensemaking is thus a dialogue between actors attempting to 
identify a plausible, unified narrative, providing stakeholders a singular sense of a 
particular event or situation.
On the other hand, divergent sensemaking examines a relatively unexplored 
dynamic whereby multiple organizational entities engage and seek to resolve conflict-
ing interpretations of the same event, but in the process they create increasingly differ-
ent views of reality. Maitlis (2005) describes “fragmented sensemaking” where key 
actors have little control over a given situation, and there is room for interpretation and 
negotiation of meaning. Divergent sensemaking moves beyond this, implying that key 
stakeholders fail to reach agreement, moving further from resolution and further from 
a coproduced energized state. Current theory recognizes multiplicity of interpretation 
(Weick, 1990, 1995), but here we articulate conditions that can lead to divergent end 
points, rather than a dynamic where multiplicity of interpretation initially precipitates 
sensemaking only to later converge.
Building on Gioia and Chittipeddi’s (1991) original model of intraorganizational 
sensemaking and sensegiving, Figure 1 presents an adaptation of their original model 
applied to an interorganizational context.
The process begins when the primary stakeholder engages in sensemaking and 
envisions a way forward. That way forward is signaled out to stakeholders in an 
attempt to sensegive. Organizational stakeholders receive the signal and conduct their 
own envisioning in light of the received sensegiving, and then send their own signal. 
This initial exchange provides an opportunity for all parties to consider all signals and 
sensegiving messages in a reenvisioning stage. In this way, the reenvisioning stage is 
a shared space across all interested stakeholders. It is in this space that negotiation and 
alignment of visions can take place. If stakeholders are able to align their visions, they 
codevelop new directions and communicate a renewed interpretive scheme to the 
involved stakeholders. If not, then the stages are revisited again with each stakeholder 
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attempting to envision and then sensegive before revisiting the reenvisioning stage. 
This dynamic leads to convergent sensemaking.
Research Method
In line with prior sensemaking studies (Christianson et al., 2009; Weick, 1988, 1993), 
this research takes an inductive approach to examining the environment within which 
the live fire event and subsequent actions occurred. This analysis focuses on the chain 
of events that was derived from an analysis of interviews with key participants from 
the MWD, transcripts from the public meetings, an in-depth analysis of public com-
ments submitted to the Federal Docket, and an analysis of newspaper coverage 
throughout the course of the disruption. Through the examination of texts, documents, 
and individual perceptions of the relevant entities, the interpretive approach builds a 
symbolically constructed understanding of identity. The researchers were granted 
access to a generally inaccessible investigation site, and a single case method was 
selected in line with Yin’s (1984) guidelines for case selection. A single case study 
allows for the development of rich and detailed descriptions of an organizational dis-
ruption and provides an opportunity to adequately capture the nuances of this focal 
event (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
Data Collection
Onsite interviews were conducted with six key internal stakeholders over a 2-day 














Figure 1. Convergent sensemaking/sensegiving map.
Source. Adapted from Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991).
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length. Each interview was recorded and transcribed to ensure the accuracy of the 
subsequent analysis. Interviews began with an open-ended question regarding the 
interviewee’s role in the USCG organization, role in the live fire event, and general 
role in the public communication process. Respondents were also asked to respond to 
coverage in external media such as newspapers and to explain the organizational 
responses to media commentary. Quotes from interviews are identified in the follow-
ing analysis. In addition to interview data, substantial quantitative and textual data 
were aggregated for the case study. Through the course of the live fire event, the public 
comment period allowed external stakeholders to submit testimony and written opin-
ions. From September 8, 2006, through December 12, 2006, 979 public comments 
were filed into the Federal Register as part of the public comment period. The public 
record included transcripts from the nine public hearings, which were held during the 
course of the incident. In addition, 265 newspaper articles were retrieved from the 
Lexis-Nexis search engine. Newspaper articles written between January 6, 2006, and 
March 24, 2008 (the period immediately following the disruption) were collected 
through a search using a set of keywords relevant to the case study.
Data Analysis
Data were coded to identify the key themes and general attitudes that emerged in both 
the public comments and the press coverage. Coders examined each public comment 
and each newspaper article and categorized them into one of 11 themes: commerce, 
community relations, civil rights, disruption, environment, fishing and recreation, 
government, international relations, militarization, public health, and zoning. Themes 
were determined based on an analysis of a subset of comments and interview data that 
suggested these as key topics representing the concerns of the public as reflected dur-
ing the comment period. Coders also rated each public comment and newspaper article 
based on a Likert-type scale to rank the general attitude of the article. Two coders were 
used to measure the public’s sentiment: intercoder reliability was measured using 
Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1968) and indicates substantial agreement (α = .82). A first-
order analysis was derived from the themes and sentiment analysis. These data were 
used to construct the detailed story that developed over the 6 months (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004). A second-order analysis was subsequently conducted to develop an 
explanatory set of triggers to advance our theoretical perspective (Van Maanen, 1979).
Live Fire and the U.S. Coast Guard’s MWD
In line with previous work on sensemaking and sensegiving (Christianson et al., 2009; 
Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), this study focuses on ramifications of the live fire event as 
an organizational disruption. In order to understand the unfolding of divergent trajec-
tories, it is first important to consider the context of the disruption. The primary mis-
sion of the USCG is to protect the public, the environment, and the United States’ 
economic and security interests in all maritime regions located within the territory of 
the United States. At a national level, the USCG is broken down into 17 districts and 
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a headquarters in Washington, D.C. The MWD of the USCG is composed of approxi-
mately 6,000 men and women, with about 100 staff in the MWD headquarters office. 
The MWD headquarters is responsible for response, prevention, and planning opera-
tions in the Midwest region, and oversees five sectors that perform a wide range of 
functions at the local level. At the time of data collection, leadership within the district 
headquarters consisted of a District Commander and a command staff that included a 
Rear Admiral serving as the chief of staff, a Master Chief Petty Officer serving as 
Command Master Chief, a senior legal officer, and a public liaison officer. Prior to 
2006, the office had two public relations officers but the MWD had recently been 
allocated an additional officer to serve in the new role of Chief of Response. The role 
of the Chief of Response was intended to be a mix of public relations and internal com-
munication operations.
The MWD was continuing an ongoing process of increasing preparedness training 
in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a subsequent 2002 man-
dated change in the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The USCG had increased 
border defense, increased shipping channel defenses on the international border 
between the United States and Canada, and increased general training for boating units 
in the district subdivisions. In 2005, as part of the upgraded defense, the USCG decided 
to arm boats in the Great Lakes area with larger caliber weapons. The USCG began 
mounting M240 machine guns, also called Mounted Automatic Weapons, onto patrol 
boats to provide added firepower. Prior to this, crews had been outfitted with hand-
guns, shotguns, and smaller caliber M-16 machine guns. As with any maneuver 
involving activity near the border between the United States and Canada, counterparts 
in Canada were notified of the planned arming and subsequent training, and it was 
determined that there was no conflict with existing treaties that prohibit militarization 
of the border.
To facilitate automatic weapons training, the MWD established a number of tempo-
rary training zones in January 2006. Training zones are designated areas announced to 
the public; boaters are required to stay out of the zones during training for safety rea-
sons. For each temporary training zone, an individual rulemaking proposal is filed in 
the Federal Register, as required, announcing the planned training exercise and the 
closure of the area around the training zones. After months of conducting training in 
temporary zones the district commander, in conjunction with the Department of 
Homeland Security, decided to establish permanent training zones to facilitate repeated 
training over a substantial period of time without the need for temporary zones. As part 
of this process, the district’s legal officer filed federal document E6-123 on August 1, 
2006, in a procedure referred to as “proposed rulemaking,” which proposed the cre-
ation of 34 permanent safety zones on the Great Lakes within which the USCG would 
be able to conduct training exercises using live fire ammunition. By creating perma-
nent zones, the MWD hoped to reduce bureaucratic waste associated with each tempo-
rary filing. The USCG viewed this process as a means of streamlining the process, 
reducing the time spent managing proposals for temporary zones, and standardizing 
public communication about the training. Mariners would be warned of trainings and 
prohibited from entering the zones only when training occurred. Training was expected 
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to happen roughly 60 days throughout the year, meaning that each of the 34 zones 
would be used 1 to 2 days a year.
The filing of the proposed rulemaking created a 30-day public comment period in 
which external stakeholders could file concerns regarding the rule. For proposed rules 
of this type, comment periods usually resulted in a handful of letters, with no more 
than 25 comments filed even in rare cases. The commanding officers of the MWD 
expected that the comment period would close, as planned, on August 31, 2006, and 
the training zones would become permanent. An article was published on August 24, 
2006, in The Bay City Times (Kart, 2006) describing the MWD’s plan for live fire 
training and questioning the proposed live ammunition safety zones on the Great 
Lakes. The Bay City Times article, “Bullets Over the Bay? Could Be the Coast Guard,” 
was the first publication by an external entity to refer to the MWD’s proposal. The 
article, paired with subsequent public statements issued by numerous state legislators, 
sparked an outcry from public stakeholders seen through increased media coverage, 
the involvement of a number of congressmen and senators (both at the state and 
national level), and an avalanche of public comments. As a result of the number of 
requests received after publication of the article in The Bay City Times and other news 
articles, the MWD agreed to extend the public comment period another 60 days and to 
conduct nine public meetings explaining the rulemaking process and providing public 
stakeholders an opportunity to voice their concerns. In the end, the MWD, in consulta-
tion with senior administrators, decided to withdraw the proposal for the live fire 
safety zones.
This broad event is referred to here as the live fire event; the full scope of the event 
provides a unique opportunity to study organizational sensemaking and sensegiving in 
the midst of an unsuccessful implementation of an important strategic initiative. This 
case underscores the central role that external stakeholders can take in shaping the 
sensemaking process. An examination of the roles of these various stakeholders dem-
onstrates how multiple interpretations emerge and the conflicting perspectives of rep-
resentative stakeholders exacerbated the situation and further fueled the unfolding 
incident to develop into a major disruption for the MWD. In considering the roles of 
various stakeholders, Table 1 provides an outline of the various stakeholders involved 
in this event. Table 1 gives a sense of the size and role of each stakeholder. In addition, 
sample quotes are included that characterize the communication that was typical of 
each group, as well as some of the primary concerns of each group.
Interplay of Sensemaking and Sensegiving in the Live Fire 
Case
Organizations often set forth a path of action, but all too often fail to fully understand 
external stakeholders’ concerns. In this case, the USCG experienced a major disrup-
tion in which there was a clear and direct impact on the organization’s primary goals. 
Unlike traditional sensemaking cases (Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1993), this system 
involved external stakeholders who actively interpreted and shaped the unfolding 
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sensegiving is first broken into the stages of strategic change: envisioning, signaling, 
reenvisioning, and energizing. Having established the process of change undertaken 
through the course of the live fire event, the unfolding of divergent processes are con-
sidered, setting forth conditions under which interorganizational sensemaking pro-
cesses result in divergent outcomes.
Envisioning
Envisioning is a sensemaking process where the primary stakeholder sets forth a 
vision for change, or a path for responding to an event that is typically characterized 
by novelty or ambiguity. It is during this phase that leaders set forth a path of interpre-
tation, seeking understanding of the equivocal nature of a situation. MWD leaders 
were initially certain that the proposed training zones would be accepted as unequivo-
cally necessary and safe. They were also positive of the safety of the planned training 
because it had been ongoing for several months without incident or complaint through 
the use of temporary zones. Environmental assessments had also been conducted to 
determine that acceptable legal limits were met for ordnance released into the water. 
These experiences contributed to an unequivocal perspective on the safety of the train-
ing procedures, with regard to both the environment and public maritime safety. When 
the communications office thus detected a negative public response, a trajectory of 
sensemaking was set in motion that focused on a lack of understanding on the part of 
the public.
Internally, the MWD engaged in a routinized process. Routinization of the process 
stemmed from the viewpoint that the MWD had legal authority to proceed with the 
proposed training zones. The rulemaking process was well established, and one in 
which the public had not interfered. One member of the command staff captured the 
sentiment of the MWD, noting that,
At the field level, since we do safety zones or security zones all the time, we never 
publish . . . anything in the media, we rely upon the Federal Register, which is . . . the 
minimum legal requirement. (MWD Interview #6)
Indeed, according to another senior officer,
There was really not a thought given to right or wrong, as to whether this is a good thing. 
We do these things all the time. The fact that we’ve done this many exercises without a 
blip, I mean, we know what we are doing. (MWD Interview #3)
The quote speaks to the perception of training exercises as an internal matter and taken 
for granted, reinforcing the general perception held by members of the organization.
Equivocal situations often trigger sensemaking (Weick, 1990, 1995). Members of 
an organization, when faced with multiple interpretations, work to reduce the equivo-
cality by engaging in conversation and negotiating a unified narrative to explain the 
situation. When the media began to cover the live fire proposal, starting with the 
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article in The Bay City Times on August 24, 2006, the event began to spiral into a major 
disruption. The appearance of media coverage signaled that the MWD envisioning of 
the rulemaking process had obfuscated the equivocal nature of the rulemaking pro-
cess. Stakeholders had envisioned a different picture of the live fire zones. In an effort 
to achieve convergent sensemaking trajectories, the MWD thus sought to engage in 
sensegiving with external stakeholders.
Signaling
In the signaling stage, one stakeholder communicates a plan out to other stakeholders 
as sensegiving. In this case, the sensegiving process occurred from both the MWD and 
external stakeholders such as congressional members, reporters, mayors, and the gen-
eral public. From the USCG’s perspective, signaling occurred through the initial filing 
and subsequent communication at the public hearings. The first filing in the Federal 
Docket served as a signal that the MWD intended to formalize a change to existing 
routines. External stakeholders signaled back in response, expressing concern over the 
proposed plan. In response to stakeholder concerns over the proposed zones, and as an 
ongoing part of the sensemaking process, the MWD subsequently enacted public hear-
ings as a way to communicate with the public. These sessions provided the MWD 
command with an opportunity to explicate what they perceived to be the intent of the 
live fire training zones. Maintaining the educational framing, the focus of the sessions 
was on educating the public regarding the importance of the ongoing training.
On the other hand, external stakeholders viewed news of the proposal for perma-
nent training zones as a trigger event that indicated a need for active engagement, and 
thus through a series of active (and negative) responses to the Federal Register 
announcement a grassroots action emerged in opposition to the MWD. Early media 
coverage sparked additional reporting in states around the Great Lakes region, but also 
moved nonprofit organizations and business groups to action. For instance, the 
Michigan Environmental Council joined the cause and launched a call for new envi-
ronmental studies. Numerous mariners and boaters’ organizations also appealed to the 
public through editorials and interviews with the media (Hawthorne, 2006). The sig-
naling phase began a process of organizing and coalescing on the part of external 
stakeholders, as the various external stakeholders responded to the MWD’s actions.
Reenvisioning
In the reenvisioning stage, all stakeholders both internal to the MWD and external to 
the MWD, responded to the proposed plan, interpreted, and engaged in collective sen-
semaking (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). In this case, however, the transition from sig-
naling to reenvisioning occurred as members of the MWD began to take note of the 
strong negative reaction from the public.
Officers within the MWD held a general perception that the public was not a valid 
participant in the rulemaking process, and that any misunderstanding invoked a need 
for greater education. But politicians, business owners, and residents around the Great 
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Lakes region actively reacted to the USCG’s proposal. Internally, leaders within the 
MWD interpreted the public (external) response as grounds for sensemaking, calling 
for a need to recraft external communication strategy, rather than perceiving a need for 
sensemaking in cooperation with external stakeholders. In this way, the MWD can be 
viewed as having reverted to the envisioning stage where their original internal sense-
making was retrenched. External stakeholders were not viewed as valid members of 
the process, and external responses were integrated into the internal process without 
undertaking an internal-external dialogue. The public meetings, media coverage, and 
public comments did allow a wide variety of external stakeholder groups to engage in 
the reenvisioning process. What began as a variety of different signals of concern, 
such as environmental impact or citizen safety slowly were incorporated into an over-
all vision of the MWD as an organization that had overstepped its bounds. 
Environmentalists, commercial shippers, and local citizens started considering each 
other’s concerns as they sought to make sense of the unfolding events. The volume and 
intensity of public comment, however, forced internal stakeholders to begin to address 
and to rationalize the response from external stakeholders. The appearance of The Bay 
City Times articles, as well as subsequent media coverage, triggered a deluge of public 
comments. As one public relations officer noted,
It was then we realized in the wrong, we did not communicate well enough ahead of time 
to know what kind of interest there would be . . . so we had to extend the comment period 
another 30 days. (MWD Interview #5)
Energizing
Finally, in the energizing stage stakeholders come into alignment on a revised plan. At 
this stage, a failure to gain alignment can derail the sensemaking process in its entirety, 
as appears to be the case in the live fire event. The perception that public concern arose 
from a lack of information in turn led to the enactment of a response by the USCG that 
focused on a series of public meetings intended to educate the public. The public educa-
tion strategy was seen by internal stakeholders as a means to diffuse highly negative 
reactions from uninformed citizens. One MWD officer observed, “We really did an 
education piece, so when someone came in with a head of steam we were able to diffuse 
that to some extent” (MWD Interview #3). The internal perception that the enactment 
of education was as an appropriate response was supported by an organizational culture 
driven by routinized procedures, rather than fluid engagement and adaptation. With 
scientific studies and evidence from safely conducted trainings, it was clear to internal 
stakeholders that the trainings aligned with existing protocol for establishing safety 
zones. The communication office’s message in its initial responses to stakeholders 
focused on an “American law enforcement mission and a homeland security mission 
that we have to provide to the public” (MWD Interview #5). The focus on education 
and information ultimately invalidated external perspectives; according to one officer, 
“Everybody has a right to their own opinion, but not everybody has a right to their own 
version of the facts” (MWD Interview #3). The notion that external stakeholders did not 
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have a valid version of the pertinent facts undermined the possibility that external 
stakeholders would be engaged as legitimate sensemaking participants. This discon-
nect, however, created an opportunity for external stakeholders to be energized around 
their interpretation of the events. As a result, they energized and became an even stron-
ger force that the MWD could no longer discount.
Ultimately, it became evident that there was not enough public support to continue 
with the formalization of the proposed training zones. A retroactive process of sense-
making within the USCG revealed divergent internal and external trajectories pertain-
ing to the discussion of the live fire zones. The public affairs officer explained,
We were able to determine that there were . . . environmental concerns, public safety 
concerns—am I going to get shot at when I am out there? Access to fishing spots, 
deconfliction with ferry routes and things like that. . . . Those are the broader categories, and 
we realized we hadn’t been fully versed on the concerns of people. (MWD Interview #1)
The officer further commented,
The way I see it is because it was a long process nobody at any one point maybe we didn’t 
quite connect the dots with what the interest might be in terms of the public and other 
entities in the Great Lakes. (MWD Interview #1)
Despite the need to establish permanent training zones, on December 18, 2006, the 
USCG announced its decision to withdraw the plan for permanent live fire zones on 
the Great Lakes. On January 5, 2007, a formal notice appeared in the Federal Register 
announcing the USCG’s decision withdrawing their notice for proposed rulemaking. 
A summary of this sensemaking and sensegiving interplay is provided in Figure 2.
Viewing the interplay of the primary and external stakeholders, we can see how the 
MWD inadvertently makes numerous missteps with unintended consequences. First, 
they fail to engage with the external stakeholders in any significant way in the early 
envisioning stage. As a result, they are not able to anticipate the interpretations of their 
announcement in the Federal Register. When divergent views begin to emerge, they 
recalcitrantly persist in their original stance and insist that the public just needs to be 
educated. This persistence creates even stronger opposition as the external stakehold-
ers interpret that they have been ignored. Ultimately, the external stakeholders, origi-
nally viewed as less powerful by the MWD, are able to dominate and shape the change 
implementation (Sonenshein, 2010).
Triggers for Divergent Sensemaking
Using the first-order analysis that allowed us to deconstruct the interplay between sen-
semaking and sensegiving, we next conducted a second-order analysis to develop gen-
eralizations that set the conditions for the divergent trajectories of sensemaking. This 
analysis revealed four key triggers that precipitated the divergence: (a) unidirectional 
and parsimonious communication, (b) multifaceted understandings of organizational 
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Date USCG Inter-Organizational 
Stakeholders
2/1/06 USCG introduces ad hoc live fire 
training on the Great Lakes in 
response to Congressional and 
USCG HQ directives 
7/1/06 Envisioning – Sensemaking
USCG sets forth vision for safety 
zones 
Action seen as routine and 
unequivocal due to prior 
uncontested ad hoc exercises 
8/01/06 Signaling – Sensegiving 
USCG announces permanent 
safety zones in Federal Register
as standard operating procedure 
Assumes live fire training poses no 
concerns (environmental, safety) 
Anticipates minimal public 
response
Envisioning –Sensemaking
External stakeholders interpret 
announcement  as problematic 
Divergent views emerge 
Various groups vision to oppose 




USCG acknowledges divergent 
views but interprets them as 
uneducated perspectives 
Doesn't co-produce sensemaking 
Signaling – Sensegiving
Various groups engage in letter-
writing campaigns, request for 




USCG continues to educate 
through public hearings and press 
releases




Grass root opposition gains 
momentum. Interprets USCG 
“education” as not listening to 
their concerns Organizing and 
coalescing among various 
external stakeholder groups 
1/05/07 Energizing – 
Sensemaking/Sensegiving
Others' views dominate 
USCG withdraws live fire 
proposal
 
Figure 2. Divergent sensemaking and sensegiving during the live fire event.
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identities, (c) misaligned cues, and (d) an emergence of coproduced sensemaking 
among the interorganizational stakeholders.
Unidirectional and Parsimonious Communication
Unidirectional and parsimonious communication by internal stakeholders led to a 
derailment of alignment in sensemaking and sensegiving, particularly toward later 
stages of the rulemaking process. Prior to the live fire event, leaders at the MWD did 
not consider external stakeholders as a part of the rulemaking process, and as a result, 
did not think it necessary to engage them in a sensemaking dialogue. External stake-
holders were excluded for two key reasons. First, the merits of live fire training were 
not seen as equivocal, and thus early on, no sensemaking processes were initiated by 
the MWD, and no alternative explanations for events were sought. Second, the MWD 
considered rulemaking as an internal process. As a result, MWD leaders had little 
reason to inform the public of the permanence of the zones ahead of the proposal, 
much less to engage the public in the process of making sense of the need to train, or 
the need for safety zones. This perspective informed the unidirectional sensegiving 
approach observed during the signaling stage. Emphasis on facts, education, and a 
perceived naiveté on the part of the public resulted in the enactment of a reality in 
which external stakeholders were viewed as invalid participants in the sensemaking 
process. Although the legal requirements and the mandated mission lent credence to 
this sensemaking trajectory as a plausible one, the unfolding external reactions under-
mined the perception that there was a routinized and legitimate mandate to move 
forward.
Multifaceted Organizational Identities
Weick (1995) observed that sensemaking springs out of the concept of identity; in 
other words, the process of sensemaking is grounded in the organizational identity 
held by the stakeholders involved. Organizational identity is thus defined by what 
stakeholders of an organization find to be central, distinctive, and sustaining 
(Christianson et al., 2009; Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Wrzesniewski, Dutton, & Debebe, 
2003). Over time, organizations and the individuals that comprise them, develop a 
coherent identity through actions and interactions. As an organization adapts and 
learns in response to changing conditions, the identity of an organization bounds the 
potential responses by limiting stakeholders’ frame of reference (Christianson et al., 
2009; Kogut & Zander, 1996). The sensemaking process is enacted within the framing 
of established identities.
As Christianson et al. (2009) observed, events such as the live fire event disrupt the 
limiting mechanisms of identity by raising questions about what the status quo is for a 
given organization. The events of September 11, 2001, provided the USCG with an 
opportunity to reevaluate its mission as an organization. In the aftermath, the U.S. gov-
ernment expanded the USCG’s overall mission to include an increased emphasis on the 
defense of U.S. waterways, and a renewed focus on preparedness. As one officer 
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observed, “The Coast Guard fundamentally had to adjust its thinking with respect to 
being able to respond to threats to include vessel risks” (MWD Interview #4). For the 
MWD this increased responsibility was consistent with what it perceived as its identity. 
In reference to the military role of the USCG, another officer observed, “We are a 
branch of the Armed Forces, and we obviously work under the Department of Homeland 
Security” (MWD Interview #2). The role of the USCG as a military branch was viewed 
internally as an integral component of the identity of the organization.
The internal perception of the USCG as a military organization is critical in this 
incident. Military organizations represent a typification of routinized organizations 
(Blau & Scott, 2003; Janowitz, 1959; Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994). The military 
is dependent on rational organizational processes that allow for the enforcement of a 
strict regimen of adherence to orders and procedure (Roberts et al., 1994). The bureau-
cratization of the armed services, paired with an organizational environment marked 
by professionalism and a high level of management results in a high level of collective 
rationality and observance of prescribed routines (Segal & Segal, 1983). From the 
perspective of the USCG, therefore, the arming of small cutters did not conflict with 
the existing identity as this was considered an inherent part of the organization’s 
enduring mission. Training with the new weapons, instead, was seen as a prescription 
for invoking a routine structure, which the USCG was well equipped to execute in its 
role as a military organization.
According to one senior officer, any course of action other than live fire training 
with the new weapons would have been inconsistent with the organization’s identity. 
As the officer observed,
Our people are out there to defend this nation and enforce its laws. If we are going to give 
them tools to do that, then they need to be trained to do that. So we have obviously given 
them the tools, it would be negligent of us if we didn’t train them. (MWD Interview #2)
This sentiment informed the decision-making process regarding how to proceed with 
establishing live fire zones. Internally, this identity further reinforces the notion that 
weapons were part of the USCG’s everyday existence. The machine guns that the 
USCG planned to mount on its cutters and control boats were actually just an updated 
version of the guns that had previously been used. In addition, the new version of the 
guns was perceived to be an improvement because it involved lower levels of required 
maintenance. Thus, the proposed change in training and arming was seen as an incre-
mental change, and thus as consistent with the existing routines to handle adoption of 
new weapons.
Identity is not a one-sided coin (Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006); the USCG had a clearly 
established perception of its identity, but external stakeholders simultaneously held 
another perspective. Identity is a dual construct composed of internal culture and val-
ues, as well as the external expression of the organization to the public (Hatch & 
Schultz, 2002). The external identity of an organization is in part constructed through 
the external reputation of the organization, where reputation is defined as the long-
standing and relatively stable collective judgment that outsiders hold toward a given 
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organization (Fombrun, 1996). The public rarely encountered the militarized identity 
of the USCG; it is clear from public comments that external stakeholders viewed the 
USCG as having a distinct identity as a relatively nonmilitarized organization. For 
instance, one commercial shipping outfit noted that the “icebreaking and buoy tending 
services [conducted by the USCG are] appreciated by commercial shipping and Great 
Lakes ports” [Public comment 552]. An individual commented, “I take great comfort 
in knowing the USCG is there in case I need them . . .” [Public comment 502]. Other 
individuals echoed this perspective, “The Coast Guard throughout history has been a 
welcome site on the Great Lakes” [Public comment 498], and “The Coast Guard is the 
guardian of our waters. They have dedicated their time and experience to improve and 
enhance our beaches and to prevent oil spills and pollution” [Public comment 485]. As 
these comments demonstrate, the USCG and the general public saw different aspects 
of the USCG’s identity as salient. These perspectives set the stage for the process of 
sensemaking undertaken as the live fire event unfolded.
Citizens in the MWD were familiar with the USCG largely through public outreach 
efforts and routine duties including lake rescues, boater assistance, and summer 
patrols; but these actions were not perceived to be components of a military organiza-
tion. On the Great Lakes, the USCG is known for its search and rescue operations. The 
MWD of the USCG routinely patrols the Great Lakes region and is responsible for 
rescuing distressed boaters, monitoring licensing and regulations, and patrolling sum-
mer crowds. In addition, the MWD of the USCG is also responsible for ensuring that 
navigation aids on the lakes are in good working order. These types of activities do not 
generally involve visible display of side arms or firepower of any variety. Here then, 
is a conflict in the identity-image relationship of the USCG. The perceived militariza-
tion of the Great Lakes and patrol boats as presented to the public conflicted with the 
publicly held identity. The USCG’s own view of identity as a branch of the military, 
concerned with Homeland Security and defense of the inland water ways, led organi-
zational members to view live fire exercises on the Great Lakes as routine and 
embarked on the enactment process in a routine fashion. Public stakeholders, on the 
other hand, saw the use of weapons in public space as contrary to the protectionist 
identity they associated with the USCG MWD, and therefore viewed the live fire exer-
cises as conflicting with the traditional mission of the USCG. These conflicting identi-
ties precipitated the public outcry that followed the proposal of the permanent training 
zones, and set the stage for divergent sensemaking trajectories. In turn, this drove 
conflicting boundaries from which sensemaking processes were enacted.
Misaligned Cues and Divergent Trajectories
Weick (1995) notes that the focus on cues is a critical part of the sensemaking process 
and that they are small “seeds” that people use to grow larger stories to explain what 
is going on (p. 120). In this way, cues provide information that reinforces the plausibil-
ity of a given sensemaking trajectory. When researchers observe sensemaking from 
multiple perspectives, as in the current case, it is possible to see how the salience of 
cues can differ across sensemaking trajectories and drive multiple interpretations.
Weber et al. 85
Internal cues and sensemaking trajectories. Examining cues in the live fire case, there 
was a misalignment between what the MWD perceived to be key issues and what the 
public considered to be the primary points of contention. The MWD relied on congres-
sional aides and reporters as the primary feedback channels; this created a limited 
feedback mechanism through which officers were able to gain insight about external 
opinions. Internally, the MWD provided information about planned training and pub-
lic outreach, and in turn, the MWD was able to gain feedback through the newspaper 
articles that were reported, and through input from officials. Evidence of the internal 
perception of the disruption is seen in the way that organizational leaders discuss their 
response. Following the public outcry, the MWD opened an extended comment period 
and a nine city public hearing tour; inside the MWD, success of the public hearings 
was judged based on community participation and active involvement on the part of 
the MWD leadership. “The whole point of the process [the public meetings] was to try 
to really show our willingness to . . . take [our officers] all over the Great Lakes . . .,” 
explained a senior officer at the MWD headquarters,
We were moving a whole bunch of people and these boards with all the information and 
all the equipment to record it. And I think another thing that made that thing as successful 
as it was the Admiral’s personal commitment to it. (MWD Interview #3)
As the organization progressed in its reaction, officers at the MWD headquarters 
looked for cues that their sensegiving signals were succeeding, thus reinforcing their 
current sensemaking trajectory. For instance, one officer considered a particular public 
meeting a success when a local Mayor thanked them for making the effort to visit their 
area. Comments from the public were perceived to be “very respectful,” although 
primarily “non-rational” (MWD Interview #4). In classifying the comments from the 
public as irrational for the most part, the MWD officers were able to maintain their 
existing trajectory without facing the reality of the public’s growing concerns as exter-
nal stakeholders. In addition to gauging success based on feedback from officials, 
MWD officers took cues from the sentiment of press coverage as reinforcement. More 
than 250 newspaper articles pertaining to the live fire event were published in local 
newspapers throughout the region. Based on the coding, 34% of articles published 
during the incident focused on community relations. The tone of the press coverage, 
however, was consistently more positive than the content of the public comments, 
creating a misperception for the MWD as they focused on sentiment in the media, and 
not on the public comments.
External cues and sensemaking trajectories. MWD officers held the perception that the 
public meetings were providing much needed information to an uninformed public. 
On the other hand, the public response coalesced around a separate sensemaking tra-
jectory that focused on the lack of coherence between expressed concerns and the 
response of MWD officials. The full 90-day public comment period yielded a total of 
979 public comments. In analyzing the public record, only 7% of articles addressed 
issues pertaining to community relations. For instance, 51% of newspaper articles 
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focused on zone locations as their primary topic, echoing public concerns about where 
zones were located. Twenty-one percent focused on the impact of increased lead in the 
water as the result of live ammunition and 13% addressed concerns about increased 
militarization of the Great Lakes region.
During initial stages, public perception fluctuated significantly but trended down-
ward over time. On the other hand, media coverage vacillated but trended positive in 
the long run. With the MWD relying on newspaper articles as a primary input channel, 
the true nature of public perception was never fully considered, despite the ready 
availability of public records of the comments. Indeed, while the MWD command 
assumed that their communication efforts were increasing public perception, Figure 3 
more clearly illustrates the continued decline of public attitude toward the USCG’s 
MWD proposal. As the diagram illustrates, the overall trend of public perception was 
downward over time, despite a small increase in the initial stages of the USCG’s reac-
tion to the disruption. The ongoing public hearings, focused on education and informa-
tion, did little to improve public sentiment.
The primary themes of the comments also reveal insight into the public’s feelings of 
dissatisfaction with regard to the proposal. Primary themes had little to do with the need 
for more education, but emphasized salient concerns relating to a host of issues. 
Concerns regarding safety focused on the location of zones and maritime safety. The 
Shipper’s Trade Association of the Great Lakes, for example, noted that nine of the live 
fire zones were in or near major shipping lanes, and asked that nearly two thirds of the 
firing zones be changed to accommodate shipping concerns. Plans for informing boat-
ers about training exercises were also a concern. Not all boaters have radios or use them 
Figure 3. Trend of public attitude during organizational disruption.
Note. Solid line = trend line.
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regularly; cell phones, e-mail, and the Internet are often used as primary channels for 
communication. Numerous citizens asked that the MWD establish a clear method for 
notifying the public of the exercises. In a quote to reporters, Duluth’s Mayor Herb 
Bergson commented, “When people are thinking of where they’re going to go fishing, 
are they going to go to the place that’s quiet? Or the place where people are shooting?” 
(Egan, 2006, p. 5). The attitude of MWD officials was that the existing zones repre-
sented a compromise between existing boating areas and the needed training zones.
In addition to safety concerns, public responses focused on environmental issues. 
When planning to create the proposed safety zones, the USCG hired two environmen-
tal firms to conduct a health risk assessment study. The results of the risk assessment 
study found that there would be no elevated risks as a result of increasing lead levels 
due to lead bullets fired into the lake during training exercises. In his public statement 
during the public hearing in Waukegan, IL, a senior manager from one of the environ-
mental firms said that the study had been conducted using overestimates of all materi-
als to be used by the USCG, and that the risk assessment study clearly indicated that 
no risk existed and that lead concentration levels in testing areas would be one third of 
maximum allowable level. Yet the environmental study did nothing to quell critics: in 
a statement filed in the public record, the former Illinois Lt. Governor pressed the 
USCG to conduct further studies and submit the proposal for analysis by the 
Environmental Protection Agency. The call for additional studies was echoed in a for-
mal letter by the attorney general of Illinois, and high-ranking politicians in other 
states including New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The primary concern stemmed 
from the guns, which are capable of firing 200 to 600 rounds a minute, depositing an 
estimated 6,720 pounds of lead into the water each year.
The reliance by MWD officials on press coverage to indicate appropriate cues in 
turn meant that such calls for additional studies, paired with the general public’s envi-
ronmental concerns, were not given full weight in the course of the internal sensemak-
ing process. The MWD continued to focus on cues that proved valuable in the past; 
press coverage and indirect feedback from officials, but as evidenced by the reaction 
to calls for additional environmental studies even this was couched within the frame 
of existing routines. Since the focus on existing cues provided the USCG with a plau-
sible explanation of the event, that the public did not fully understand the information 
that had been shared, there was no need to seek additional feedback. Furthermore, in 
holding public hearings, officers within the MWD had stepped outside existing proce-
dures and taken extraordinary steps to gain input.
Conflicting trajectories. External stakeholders—particularly public citizens involved in 
grassroots efforts—had approached the live fire zones with a different framing than that 
of the USCG through the construction of a distinct perception of the USCG’s identity 
and a focus on different cues during the sensemaking process. Public stakeholders 
focused on the lack of transparency on the part of the MWD; stakeholders were inter-
ested in having their concerns heard by officials from the MWD at public meetings, yet 
it was clear that the MWD entered into the public meetings with the intention of listen-
ing without engaging. Indeed, interviews demonstrated that education of the public 
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took precedent over listening to concerns. Continued expression of what the MWD 
viewed as unreasonable or irrational concerns at the public meetings led the USCG to 
continue to focus on education and took the expression of concern as a cue that the 
public still did not understand. The public sensemaking trajectory was coalescing 
around a story about a distrustful, inconsiderate MWD, while the MWD story was 
forming around the idea of an uninformed public. These two trajectories were not 
headed toward convergence. When this fact became apparent, MWD officers took their 
cue from public officials and reporters (through newspaper articles), who placed blame 
on the MWD’s inadequate communication and education efforts. In this way, the 
MWD’s response was framed by a narrow perception of the situation at hand. Framing 
of the initial reaction as a community relations and education problem led the MWD to 
construct a response that focused dually on education and community outreach. The 
MWD’s message did not change over the course of the public meetings, and in turn, 
external stakeholders took this as an indication that their concerns were not being inte-
grated into the MWD’s response plan. Continual enactment of these trajectories moved 
both parties further away from common understanding.
Coproduced Sensemaking Among External Interorganizational 
Stakeholders
The fourth trigger setting the condition for divergent sensemaking was set into action 
as the external stakeholders’ interorganizational sensemaking unfolded. Hardy, 
Phillips, and Lawrence (2003) describe this as “a cooperative, inter-organizational 
relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process, and which relies 
on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control” (p. 323). Recent studies 
have shown that collaborative interorganizational actions are often enacted around a 
particular issue or metaproblem (Hardy et al. 2006; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Werle & 
Seidl, 2012).
In this case, external stakeholders represented a wide array of groups, and through 
the process of engaging in public debate they coalesced as a movement on a common 
trajectory. In this way, the sensemaking process that external stakeholders engaged in 
led to the creation of informal structures, such as an informal coalition of shippers who 
worked together to voice their concerns to the MWD headquarters. Additionally, indi-
viduals and environmental associations called on Congressmen to exercise their influ-
ence, and Congressmen relied on the attendance of their constituents at public hearings 
to validate their involvement.
External stakeholders used the public meetings to weave an interdependent net-
work and create an alignment of interdependent actors. Weick (1995) notes that face-
to-face interactions serve as an opportunity for fine tuning the anticipated reactions of 
“others.” In this case, the public meetings provided an opportunity for both MWD staff 
members and external stakeholders to calibrate their enacted sensemaking in response 
to cues. Unfortunately, the MWD’s emphasis on a set of cues distinct from those of 
external stakeholders prevented officers from recognizing the conflicting public-pri-
vate framings. The public, however, took advantage of these opportunities to develop 
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a set of expectations for the MWD as well as for each other, organizing through enact-
ment. As the disruption continued, feelings of being forgotten, overlooked, or deceived 
took root in the minds of the external stakeholders and were shared and heard by other 
stakeholders. The various actors took action through the volume of public comments, 
written letters to congressional representatives and news media coverage. The ability 
of these varied external stakeholders to develop an alignment through sensemaking 
allowed them to have a voice significant enough to disrupt the MWD routines.
Discussion
A detailed examination of the live fire disruption reveals that the response to a major 
organizational disruption stems from distinct, but divergent, sensemaking trajectories 
that emerged in response to the proposal of the live fire training zones. This analysis 
reveals four critical triggers that set the stage for the emergence of divergent sense-
making perspectives: ignorance of equivocality of external stakeholders, multifaceted 
organizational identities, misaligned cues, and the emergence of interorganizational 
sensemaking. Because of the reinforcing nature of sensemaking, early diffraction 
caused the two trajectories to focus on different sets of cues as they continued sense-
making, causing further divergence in their views of reality. Finally, collective partici-
pation on the part of the external stakeholders created a powerful alignment of 
organizations that reshaped the environment.
The MWD’s sensemaking routines led officers to enact a reality that assumed an 
unequivocal interpretation of the trigger event. The enacted ignorance of equivo-
cality, in combination with conflicting identity lenses and misaligned cues, allowed 
for the emergence of a strong external interorganizational sensemaking that worked 
to shape the environment, resulting in the subsequent defeat of the training zones 
proposal. Seemingly inconsequential cues from external audiences resulted in an 
unwelcome outcome for the USCG. Following the withdrawal of the proposed rule-
making, the MWD was forced to move its live ammunition training to regions on 
the East Coast where training zones were already established. In addition, much of 
the training is currently conducted using simulators, creating challenges for 
preparedness.
By evaluating a major disruption that emerged from a seemingly routine procedure, 
this discussion demonstrates that failing to recognize that external stakeholders may 
have an alternate understanding of an event resulted in a misguided and unintended 
sensegiving mentality. Officers within the MWD sought to provide the public with the 
justification for the live fire training exercises. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) posited 
that sensegiving was an initial step in the sensemaking process and reactions to the 
sensegiving were then incorporated back into the sensemaking trajectory to result in a 
convergent narrative. Contrary to Gioia and Chittipeddi’s mode, we observe a deaf-
ness to incorporating the feedback from external stakeholders into the internal sense-
making trajectory. At this point, the divergent paths of sensemaking were so firmly 
entrenched that feedback could not be viewed through an alternative lens. Weick 
(1988) notes that irrevocable actions, such as the ones observed in this case, can lead 
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to “tenacious justifications and blind spots” (p. 310). Rather than observing sensemak-
ing trajectories that converge as depicted in Figure 1, this case illustrates trajectories 
that diverge toward separate paths as seen in Figure 2.
Previous research has also demonstrated the importance of organizational identity 
in both the internal and external sensemaking process (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). It is, 
however, the salience of different facets of an organization’s identity among members 
of the broader sensemaking community that make conditions ripe for divergent sense-
making. Had officers taken a more holistic view of the USCG identity, convergence of 
sensemaking perspectives may have occurred. Furthermore, the unique lenses through 
which the MWD and its external stakeholders viewed the live fire disruption made 
focusing on a common set of cues more difficult. In this way, the conditions for diver-
gent sensemaking were not mutually exclusive.
In addition, informal organizing is important to the sensemaking and sensegiving 
processes for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how organizing arises out of sense-
making (Weick, 1995). Prior to the live fire event, external stakeholders were not 
aware of each other, and were in most cases, not listening to each other. Through the 
disruption, individuals coalesced by interacting with one another about the live fire 
trigger event. The community came together to attend public meetings, consumed 
news media on the issue, and authored and enacted a “public opinion” sensemaking 
trajectory. That narrative provided the emergence of a common identity and because 
of the demonstrated willingness of individuals to work together and participate in 
dialogue; the other stakeholders’ wishes were honored. The second reason that this 
alignment of other stakeholders is important to understanding sensemaking is that it 
shows that the external stakeholders can influence and change reality for an organiza-
tion (Lewis, 2014; Sonenshein, 2010). Officers in the MWD headquarters experienced 
a different environment once external stakeholders aligned and changed the ultimate 
trajectory of the sensemaking dialogue.
Theoretical Implications
This research engages critical issues of management and strategic communication, 
examining internal decisions made by the MWD, and the resulting implications for 
community relations. A number of important implications are apparent for how schol-
ars think about sensemaking and sensegiving from a theoretical perspective and for 
framing future research. First, this work demonstrates the role that identities and 
boundaries have in sensemaking processes. Indeed, Weick (1977) notes that an orga-
nization’s views of its boundaries can influence sensemaking and potentially be prob-
lematic for the accuracy of sensemaking narratives. This dynamic was observed 
clearly in the live fire case. Employing a strict view of organizational boundaries cre-
ated extensive blind spots for officers in the MWD and enabled officers to enact a 
reality in which those outside the formal boundaries were not legitimate participants. 
As boundaries change, so does the story that unfolds. Had the MWD adapted its 
boundaries prior to the live fire event, the unfolding disruption may have captured 
perspectives of external stakeholders earlier in the process.
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If this analysis focused on traditional boundaries of the organization, then a differ-
ent analysis would have emerged, whereby a convergent, but inaccurate, sensemaking 
narrative was told. By including external stakeholders in the analysis, this research 
illustrates how two distinct sensemaking trajectories emerged from a common precipi-
tating event. Looking beyond traditional boundaries allows researchers to identify 
divergent sensemaking, and to see how participants in the surrounding environment 
impact the sensemaking process. In this way, the broader boundaries reveal how dif-
ferent stories emerge when we define the sensemaking community differently and as 
such, sensemaking stories should be qualified based on who was included in the sen-
semaking conversation.
Second, this research demonstrates the means by which enactments based on per-
ceptions shape divergent trajectories from the same event. For example, existing work 
has focused on a crisis situation, or a rare event because it is often a change that pre-
cipitates conscious sensemaking processes (Christianson et al., 2009; Heverin & Zach, 
2012; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). In this case, however, 
the disruption was borne out of the sensemaking process. If the MWD had viewed the 
introduction of live fire training as a contentious event from the start—or with aware-
ness of external stakeholders—the subsequent events would likely have unfolded in a 
starkly different manner. Indeed, the live fire event was not a major disruption at first, 
but following the news coverage trigger, the event began to spiral. Following diver-
gent sensemaking trajectories, the public quickly viewed the training as a major and 
controversial event, forcing the MWD to reevaluate its own perceptions. Trigger 
events can thus be used for reevaluation. When the MWD gained awareness of the 
public’s perception of this event as a disruption, the MWD officers changed their clas-
sification of the event as well, but it was already too late. The use of sensemaking and 
sensegiving provides a theoretical mechanism for better understanding the interaction 
in an interorganizational context, extending prior work on sensemaking. The unfold-
ing of the disruption is further the result of certain contextual features, such as concep-
tions of identity and salience of certain cues. This event did not become a major 
disruption until almost a year after the USCG had begun to enact it as routine. In this 
way, it is clear that triggering events can spark disruptions as a result of the enactment 
process undertaken by stakeholders.
Practical Implications
From a practical perspective, the live fire case and the analysis of the incident through 
a sensemaking lens suggest a number of practical implications for business communi-
cation professionals and for strategic communication. First, the officers in the MWD 
viewed the news coverage as a trigger event to deploy a routinized response of estab-
lishing a public comment period. But, as this analysis underscored, trigger events often 
are equivocal in nature. From a strategic communication perspective, the findings 
regarding trigger events suggest that organizations should routinize surveillance func-
tions. When implementing routine public relations responses, an organization should 
take care to monitor and understand a wide range of stakeholder perspectives. To that 
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point, the MWD faced a number of challenges in understanding the perspectives of its 
external stakeholders. Prior to the incident, external communication was limited due to 
constraints on the staff and a lack of established monitoring routines. The consequences 
of the disruption underscore the importance of routinized monitoring of the relevant 
environment; technological tools including news search and social media can also pro-
vide organizations with means for monitoring when personnel are limited.
Likewise, the MWD had no system for analyzing the public comments, nor was the 
staff equipped to handle the volume of comments received. In turn, when public input 
is sought, organizations need to remember to listen. Officers at the MWD headquarters 
emphasized that the public hearings were opportunities for the officers to listen and 
hear concerns, but they did not view the hearings as an opportunity to learn from with 
key public stakeholders. As a result, the true concerns of public stakeholders were not 
integrated into their sensemaking process until after the comment period had closed 
and staff members began to systematically review the submissions. It is not enough to 
seek input; internal stakeholders need to be prepared to act on what external stakehold-
ers view as reality.
Limitations and Future Research
As with much of the research on sensemaking, this is a single case study and the ability 
to draw generalizations is clearly restricted (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, in order to 
conduct this case study, it was necessary to constrain the context of the research. 
Although the boundaries in this study are broader than other similar research, ours is 
no exception to the limitations of the boundaries we have drawn. In addition, the cod-
ing schemes and the analysis of press coverage used new measurement scales, and 
future refinement is needed to enhance the sensitivity of these measures. This study is 
also a call for future sensemaking research to evaluate the limitations that artificial 
boundaries can place on a sensemaking narrative and to ask the question “According 
to whom?” when examining new events. Finally, this case focused on a fairly common 
disruption by examining a public relations event. Building on this, future research 
should continue to examine seemingly common events to understand how sensemak-
ing trajectories unfold and interact.
Conclusion
This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the 2006 live fire event in the USCG’s 
MWD. As this case study has illustrated, a retroactive examination provides significant 
insight to shape future communication efforts. It also shows how views of organizational 
and research boundaries and triggers can shape our perspective of reality and sensemak-
ing as a theoretical framework. This article provides a unique set of data from which the 
sensemaking process can be observed from multiple perspectives by examining an orga-
nizational disruption. Through the use of multiple levels of data, it was possible to 
observe how internal organizational thinking contrasted with the perception of external 
stakeholders. By applying different boundaries in a sensemaking study, researchers can 
Weber et al. 93
see multiple, potentially divergent sensemaking trajectories. In aggregate, this work sets 
the stage for future research by expanding the boundaries of sensemaking research and 
advancing studies of interorganizational strategic communication.
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